

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

April 11, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Victor Stello, Director, TMI Operations

FROM:

Don Davis, Duty Officer Team B

SUBJECT:

UPDATE ON HEADQUARTERS ADVISORY REPORT

Attached is an updated on the April 10 report addressing condenser integrity and containment isolation. Additional updates will be forwarded as the secondary systems review is completed.

Don Davis, Duty Officer Team B

shell or tubes under hydrostatic loads or turbulent flow conditions.

<u>Containment Isolation</u>

To further preclude inadvertent releases from the containment it appears prudent at this time to remove electrical and/or pneumatic octuation sources to a number of containment isolation valves which are currently closed and would not seem to be required to be opened in the near future. Containment isolation valves which fall into this category seem to be logically divided into a small group of valves which are large in size and are a single barrier to release from the containment and a larger group of valves smaller in size and in isolation arrangements which present two closed valves in series.

In the first category we would include the containment purge system 36 inch diameter outboard containment isolation valves (penetrations R549, 550, 551 and 552) and the 18 inch containment emergency sump suction lines (penetrations R 593 and 594). It would seem prudent to remove electrical and pneumatic supply to these valves. In addition it might be desirable to consider removing pneumatic supply to the inboard containment purge system isolation valves in the inlet and outlet line not currently in use by the hydrogen recombiner, while maintaining the pilot solinoid valves energized in the open position, see T. Dunnings memos of 4/5/79 and 4/6/79 to D. Tondi:

The secondary category of containment isolation valves includes those isolation valves in lines using the following penetrations: R 525, 527, 529, 543, 547, 554 D, 559, 562 B, 563, 566 and 567.

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If the available manpower to perform activities of this sort are limited, the greatest potential for reducing the risk of further releases could be achieved by concentrating the efforts on the valves in Category I.

These recommendations are forwarded for consideration and implementation as deemed prudent.